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ABSTRACT
AN EVALUATION OF THE TURKISH STABILIZATION AND LIBERALIZATION 
POLICIES SINCE 1980, IN THE LIGHT OF SOUTflERN CONE EXPERIENCE
By
Recep ÇAKAL 
MBA Thesis
Bilkent University - Ankara
Supervisor : Assist. Prof. Gökhan ÇAPOGLU
Purpose of this study is to compare the stabilization and 
liberalization policies implemented in the Southern Cone countries 
and Turkey. It investigates these policies in a comparative way, 
and evaluates the Turkish stabilization and liberalization policies 
in the light of the failure of the Southern Cone reform policies.
Policies that were implemented show close similarities in all 
countries with slight differences, Argentina and Uruguay, for 
example, opened their capital account before liberalizing their 
trade. So was the outcomes of the reform policies. All countries 
initially were able to eliminate external imbalances, to moderate 
high rates of inflation, and also to achieve high rates of growth 
compared to prereform periods. However,the shift in stabilization 
policies in the form of using the exchange rate determination 
policy (tablita) as an anti-inflationary tool created 
inconsistencies and undermined the credibility of reform policies 
in the Southern Cone.
Comparing with the Southern Cone, developments aftermath of the 
reform policies were in favor of Turkey in some aspects. The most 
obvious one was the higher performance in exports. Nevertheless, in 
some other aspects,developments resemble to the Southern Cone, such 
as unsustained monetary and fiscal restrictions and consequently, 
reemerged high rates of inflation was the common characteristic in 
all countries.
In conclusion, at present, Turkey is at the edge of the success 
or failure in terms of reform policies that were implemented since 
1980, and the success could be realized if corrective actions are 
taken immediately.
Key Words: Stabilization, Liberalization, Import-substitution, 
Export-orientation, Tablita, Capital account. Terms of Trade, 
Devaluation, Gross National Product (GNP), Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP).
IV
ÖZET
1980 SONRASI TÜRK İSTİKRAR VE LİBERASYON POLİTİKALARININ 
LATİN AMERİKA DENEYİMİ IŞIĞINDA DEĞERLENDİRİLMESİ
Hazırlayan 
Recep ÇAKAL 
İşletme Yüksek Lisans Tezi 
Bilkent Üniversitesi - Ankara
Tez Yöneticisi : Dr. Gökhan ÇAPOGLU
Bu çalışma, Latin Amerika ülkeleri’nde ve Türkiye’de uygulanan 
istikrar ve liberasyon politikalarının bir karşılaştırmasını 
amaçlamaktadır. Çalışma, Türk istikrar ve liberasyon 
politikalarının, Latin Amerika reform politikalarının başarısızlık 
nedenlerinin ışığı altında bir değerlendirmesini yapmaktadır.
Uygulanan reform politikaları bütün ülkelerde yakın benzerlikler 
göstermekle birlikte küçük farklılıklar da mevcuttur. Örneğin, 
Arjantin ve Uruguay henüz dış ticaretlerini libere etmeden ödemeler 
dengesi sermaye hesabını dışa açmışlardır. Reform politikaları, 
sonuçları açısından da yakın benzerlikler göstermektedir. Bütün 
ülkeler, başlangıçta dış dengesizlikleri elimine etmişler, yüksek 
enflasyon oranlarını daha makul seviyelere düşürmüşler ve reform 
öncesi dönemlere ~ nazaran daha yüksek büyümeyi 
gerçekleştirebilmişlerdir. Ancak, döviz kuru belirleme 
politikasının (tablita), anti-enflasyonist bir araç olarak 
kullanılması şeklinde beliren istikrar politikalarındaki bir sapma, 
Latin Amerika ülkelerinde politikalar arası tutarsızlıklara ve 
reform politikalarının güvenirliğinin yitirilmesine yol açtı.
Latin Amerika ülkeleriyle karşılaştırıldığında, reform 
politikaları sonrası gelişmeler bazı açılardan Türkiye’nin lehine 
olmuştur. Bunlardan en bariz olanı da ihracatta sağlanan üstün 
başarıdır. Mamafih, diğer birçok açıdan, gelişmeler Latin 
Amerika’daki gelişmelere benzerlik göstermektedir. Örneğin, sıkı 
para ve maliye politikalarının terkedilmesi ve ardından yeniden 
ortaya çıkan yüksek enflasyon oranları her ülkedeki ortak 
karakteristiklerden biridir.
Özetle, Türkiye, şu anda, 1980 sonrasında uygulanan reform 
politikaları açısından başarı ya da başarısıziğın dönüm 
noktasındadır ve başarı, ancak gerekli önlemlerin ivedi olarak 
alınmasıyla gerçekleştirilebilir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: İstikrar, Liberasyon, İthal ikamesi, İhracata 
yönelik, Tablita, Sermaye hesabı. Dış Ticaret hadleri, 
Develuasyon, Gayri Safi Milli Hasıla ( GSMH), Gayri Safi Yurt İçi 
Hasıla (GSYİH).
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INTRODUCTION
1.1. Background
At the beginning of 1970's, some Latin American countries were 
facing with high rates of inflation and external payment 
difficulties along with slow rates of economic growth. So, they 
began to search for alternative economic strategies to cope with 
these difficulties. Finally, in the middle of 1970's, the "Southern 
Cone" countries, namely, Chile, Argentina and Uruguay chose to 
adopt export oriented growth strategies in contrast to traditional 
import-substituting growth strategies. All three countries launched 
wide-ranged economic reform programs and initially they were 
successful. However, afterwards their economies faltered and the 
reform policies were abandoned. Big recessions followed the 
abandonment of reform policies.
Half a decade later, at the beginning of 1980, Turkey undertook 
a comprehensive reform program, which is known as "the January 24th 
Stabilization Program". Prior to the reform program, economic 
conditions of Turkey deteriorated and became somehow similar to 
those of the Southern Countries' initial conditions, such as; high 
inflation, balance of payments crisis, inefficiencies as a result 
of extensive government intervention, supply shortages due to, the 
shortfall of imported inputs etc. Although earlier attempts were 
made to restore economic balances, in 1978 and in 1979, these were 
only partially successful. The new program was a comprehensive one 
and was financially supported by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the World Bank and the Organization of Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD).
The aim of the program was to attain external and internal 
balances through stabilization policies, and to improve allocation 
of resources and opening-up of the country through liberalization 
policies. The reform program was able to overcome supply shortages, 
to eliminate balance of payments crisis,to achieve high rates of 
growth, and also to moderate inflation -especially in initial 
years. However,overall performance of the economy became less 
promising since 1985 compared to early years of the reform program. 
In 1986, the growth of output reached its peak at 8.1 percent of 
the real GNP growth, but at the same time exports declined by 6.7 
percent. Recovery in the export front was achieved soon by a 36 
percent increase in 1987. However, growth of output decelerated 
both in 1987 and in 1988. In 1988, the current account of balance 
of payments resulted a surplus for the first time since 1973. 
Nevertheless, expansionary fiscal and monetary policies led to the 
reemergence of high rates of inflation.
In sum, the Turkish economy improved in some aspects while 
faltering in others. Comparing with the Southern Cone countries, 
developments after the introduction of reform packages were similar 
in Turkey; being initially successful with high output growth and 
moderate inflation. However, in the Southern Cone, there was a 
great recession a decade later.
1.2. Purpose of the Study
Purpose of this study is to compare the stabilization and 
liberalization policies implemented in the Southern Cone countries 
and later in Turkey. It investigates these policies in a 
comparative and interprative way. It tries to evaluate the Turkish 
Stabilization and Liberalization policies in the light of the 
failure of Southern Cone reform packages.
1.3. Outline of the Study
First, economic conditions prior to the reform programs will 
be given in section 2. Section 3 will focus on the implemented 
policies during the reform programs with the primary emphasis on 
the Turkish economy. Afterwards, outcomes of the reform programs 
will be examined in section 4. Section 5 will concentrate on the 
evaluation of the Turkish Stabilization and Liberalizaton policies 
with specific reference to the Southern Cone experiences, and to 
the emerging consensus on implementing these policies. Section 6 
consists of the conclusions drawn from the study.
2. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS PRIOR TO THE REFORM PROGRAMS
2.1. Southern Cone Countries
The three Southern Cone economies were inward oriented and 
they become less open to the world economy since the 1920's. All 
of them had experienced some trade liberalization but they were not 
successful, and each attempt resulted with more restrictive trade 
regimes, such as extensive use of tariff and nontariff barriers. 
The effective rates of protection to domestic sales were 84 percent 
in Argentina, 15 percent in Chile, and 384 percent in Uruguay^.
All three countries experienced severe macroeconomic 
disequilibria. Chile and Argentina had high fiscal deficits prior 
to the reform programs. In Chile, fiscal deficit was 16.1 percent 
of the GDP between 1971-73, and in Argentina the same rate was 7.4 
percent (see Table 1 in section 4). Current account deficit of 
both economies were large and they were facing with foreign 
exchange shortages. Uruguay was in a better position in terms of 
external balances, but output growth was low and it even had 
declined between 1971-73. Economies of all three countries were 
severely distorted. Due to overvalued and slowly adjusting 
exchange rates, price controls, in favor of import and against of 
export biased trade regimes, export growth was slow and bottlenecks 
in production were common. Expansionary fiscal policies had 
inflationary pressures, with consequent high domestic price 
inflation. Argentina had 2300 percent inflation in March 1973. In 
Chile and Uruguay inflation rates were 1000 percent (September 
1973) and 100 percent, respectively (Corbo, et.al.,1986).
1 S a Q  C o r b o  & da  H a l o «  1907.
2.2 Turkey
Turkey's economic history resembles to those of the Southern 
Cone economies. Except for the years 1950-53, Turkey followed an 
inward-oriented development strategy. This strategy aimed to 
achieve industrial growth by import substitution and increased 
capital formation. After 1963, development strategy started to be 
formalized by five year development plans. The first two plans, 
covering the periods 1963-67 and 1968-72, were able to achieve the 
growth rate targets. Projected average growth rates were 7 percent 
for both plan periods, and realization rates were 6.6 percent and 
7.1 percent, respectively.^  Thus, growth was rapid, and the rate of 
inflation was slow. Moreover, Turkey had a capital account surplus 
in 1973. However, economy was heavily relied on government 
intervention, prices and interest rates were regulated. Extensive 
subsidies were granted to agricultural inputs and outputs along 
with some other basic commodities, such as petroleum, bread and 
sugar, and also for the products of State Economic Enterprises 
(SEEs) (Kopits,1987). SEEs accounted a large share of productive 
capacity and were highly protected from foreign competition. 
Protection was implemented through tariffs, goutas, import ( also, 
export) licencing requirements and interest-free advance
deposit requirements. Only selected exports were subject to tax 
rebates (Kopits,1987). The exchange rate was fixed and usually 
overvalued, also multiple exchange rates were used.
After 1973, with the effect of increased oil prices in 1974,
2 F i g u r e s  are b a a e d  on t h e  d a t a  g i v e n  In U G C I M C B T ,  E c o n o m i c  
R e p o  r t , 1907.
Turkey's terms of trade deteriorated and exports stagnated. Inflow 
of workers' remittances decreased starting from 1975 on, as a 
result of the overvalued exchange rate. Inflation started to rise, 
external and internal balances deteriorated. Expansionary fiscal 
and monetary policies created excess demand and exacerbated 
inflationary pressures. In 1977, total public sector deficit was 
11.3 percent of the GNP and the current account deficit was 6.5 
percent of the GNP (See Tables 3 and 4 in section 4). First signals 
of the forthcoming economic crisis were in this year. Growth rate 
decelerated and became 3.9 percent in 1977. As a result, the Third 
Five Year Development Plan period's average annual grovth rate 
realized as 6.5 percent while it was projected as 7.4 percent. Five 
Year Development Plan paused in 1978 - the first time since 1963. 
Inflation rose and became 44 percent on average in 1978. When it 
became apparent that economic conditions are deteriorating further, 
authorities initiated a gradual stabilization program in 1978. It 
failed, because only small adjustments were made, and devaluation 
policy was not supported by other measures. Prices were not 
adjusted enough to compensate for the increased cost of SEEs.
The Fourth Five Year Development Plan, covering the period 
1979-1983, mentioned for the first time to move toward a more open 
economy, and targeted an average annual growth of 8 percent for the 
plan period. However, in 1979, economy became more closed and 
exports declined. Deterioration in the economy continued, in 1979 
inflation (as measured by the GNP deflator) became 71 percent and 
output declined by 0.4 percent. Public sector deficit was reduced 
to 8.5 percent of the GNP, but it was not able to restrain demand 
sufficiently. Turkish economy was dependent upon imported
intermediate goods, therefore supply shortages arose due to 
declined imports ( See Table 4 in section 4). Current account 
deficit was reduced to 2.0 percent of the GNP. However, the 
domestic economy was no longer able to meet import and debt service 
payments, and external arrears were growing.^ A second 
stabilization attempt in 1979 did not help to restore balances. 
Turkey entered to 1980 with an inflation rate as close to 80 
percent. So, a final and more comprehensive stabilization program, 
supported by liberalization efforts, announced in January 24, 1980.
3 Ex^erna.1 8irrea.ra w e r «  $ 2 b i l l i o n  atnd $ 2 . 3  b i l l i o n  «.t t h e  e n d  ot
1976 etnd 1979« r e a p e c  t: i v e  Iv · S o u r  c e  : K o p  Itia « 1 9 0 7  ·
3. STABILIZATION AND LIBERALIZATION POLICIES
3.1. Southern Cone Countries
As a result of high inflation and externally severe balance of 
payments deficits, the first aim of the programs in each country
was to achieve external and internal balances. Hence,
macroeconomic stabilization programs took place in the middle of 
1970's. Programs were implemented with two identifiable phases to 
restore imbalances. Phase 1 and 2 policies are covered separately 
in the following sub-sections.·*
3.1.1 Phase 1 Policies
3.1.1.1. Stabilization Policies
As an anti - inflationary policy, firstly, monetary growth and 
public expenditures were restrained in each country. These policies 
were contractionary and brought recessions. Chilean recession was 
deeper than others since reduction in expenditures were much 
larger. Also, inflation reduction was the most rapid (from 1000 
percent in September 1973 to 67 percent on average in 1977). 
However, unemployment rose more than threefold, from 4.6 percent 
of the prereform period to 14.2 percent.
In Argentina, expenditures were slightly reduced and its effect 
on recession was not as much as Chilean case.Political concern 
about employment did not allow to reduce expenditures sufficiently. 
In Argentina, authorities tried to keep unemployment relatively
4 T h i s  s e c t i o n  la b a a e d  on C o r b o ,  e t . a l . » 1 9 B 6 . «  a n d  C o r b o  & di 
M e l o ,  1907.
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low, hence, stabilization effort was limited (Fernandez, cited in 
Corbo & de Melo,1987).· Inflation was cut nearly half by 1980, but 
growth was lower than the prereform period.
In Uruguay, budget deficit was progressively reduced and rapid 
growth was achieved in contrast to stagnation during the import 
substitution period. Also, inflation was reduced to 50 percent by 
the end of Phase 1 (annual average was 43.3 percent, see Table 2 in 
section 4 ) .
Real wages had fallen in all three countries. However in 
Argentina, adjustment had been achieved through a sudden decline in 
real wages but relatively low unemployment. In Chile and Uruguay, 
the decline in real wages had accompanied reduction in employment.
Due to an increase in oil prices and the fall in dollar prices 
of their main exports, both Chile and Uruguay had also to cope with 
external shocks. This external shock was less effective for 
Argentina.°
Another important difference between Argentina and the other 
two countries was that, Argentina had not been able to eliminate 
her fiscal deficit. By contrast, both Chile and Uruguay had 
eliminated their fiscal deficits, and Chile had even achieved a 
surplus (see Table 1 in section 4).
These anti-inflationary policies were insufficient to eliminate 
balance of payments crisis. So, each country had also included
5 A s t u d y  on e x t e r n a l  s h o c k s  w a s  c o n d u c t e d  b y  B e l a  B a l a s s a «  
■‘A d j u s t i n g  to e x t e r n a l  s h o c k s t T h e  N e w l y  I n d u s t r i a l i z i n g  D e v e l o p i n g  
e c o n o m i e s  In 1 9 7 4 - 7 6  a n d  1 9 7 0  — 0 1 , R e v  1 ew of w o r l d  e c o n o m i c s  
V . 1 2 1 , n o . 1 ^ 1 9 0 5 , p . 1 1 6 - 1 3 5 .
expenditure switching policies to cope with balance of payirients 
difficulties. Large real devaluations was implemented in Chile and 
Argentina in order to achieve switching. In Uruguay devaluation was 
supported by promoting nontraditional exports. Initial exchange 
rate adjustments were followed by a passive crawling peg regime in 
order to maintain purchasing power parity adjusted by changes in 
terms of trade.
3.1.1.2. Liberalization Policies
In all three countries, prices, interest rates and labor 
markets were deregulated. Deregulation in labor markets, however, 
was limited. Restrictions on trade and capital flows were reduced. 
Domestic financial market deregulation has been rapid in all three 
countries. Uruguay had removed all controls on many commodity 
prices and capital flows. However, foreign trade liberalization 
policies were implemented slowly. In Chile, on the other hand, 
labor market regulations were maintained,but price controls were 
removed. Unlike Uruguay, Chile had kept control on short term 
capital flows. Argentina had removed restrictions on capital flows 
before liberalizing foreign trade. Also, price controls were 
eliminated. However, they were re-implemented in 1977, and 
thereafter they were abandoned. Multiple exchange rates were 
unified, tariffs and taxes on exports were reduced. Nontariff 
harries were also removed.
In Uruguay, import quotas were eliminated and taxes on 
traditional exports were removed. Additionally, nontradit ional 
exports were encouraged by direct and credit subsidies. Tariffs 
were reduced to some extent. Nevertheless, there were still high
10
rates of protection until 1981 (Corbo & de Helo,1987). Opening - up 
of the capital account before liberalizing trade had caused huge 
amount of capital inflows which in turn led to the appreciation of 
both the domestic currencies of Argentina and Uruguay. As a result, 
competitiveness eroded. To some extent, labor market regulations 
had continued in all three countries. Especially in Argentina, most 
of the controls, such as prohibitions on labor dismissals and 
legislated wages remained. Both in Uruguay and Chile, labor 
mobility increased. Also,in Chile, wages were fully indexed to the 
consumer price index (CPI) both for private and public sector by 
June 1982.
Financial market deregulation, after a long period of strict 
control, was implemented in two ways: progressive elimination of 
interest ceilings and elimination of restrictions on financial 
intermediation. In both Uruguay and Argentina, directed credit 
programs were abandoned. Argentina started to implement fractional 
reserve requirement system instead of 100 percent reserve 
requirements. In Uruguay, authorities had legalized dollar deposits 
in 1974 and had removed controls on entry of banking system in 
1977. In Chile, nonbank financial intermediaries were allowed to 
operate without any control on interest offerings and public 
financial intermediaries were returned to the private sector.
Opening - up of the economy to international capital flows had 
been achieved with different timing in each country. As stated 
above, legalizing dollar deposits in Uruguay,in 1974, had brought 
free private capital movements. Also, by 1977 full convertibility 
was achieved. Argentina had eliminated controls on capital
11
movements in 1979. In Chile, however, medium term capital flows 
were deregulated while controls on short term capital inflows 
remained.
In combination with liberalization policies, the stabilization 
policies were able to eliminate external imbalance but they were 
not fully successful for the internal economy. Although high rates 
of inflation were reduced in each country, they were still at a 
disturbing rate. This brought a shift in stabilization policies, 
and new policies that are called phase 2 policies took place.
3.1.2 Phase 2 Policies
Second phase of stabilization policies concentrated on the 
exchange rate determination as an anti-inflationary tool. Since 
expectations about inflation and devaluation could disturb dynamics 
of stabilization, it was thought that preannouncing exchange rate 
targets would break inflationary expectations and would serve 
stabilizing the economy (Corbo &de Melo,1987). The exchange rate 
preannouncement (tablita) was adopted in February 1978 in Chile, 
and, in December 1978 both in Argentina and in Uruguay. The 
exchange rate policy was basically an active crawling peg regime.
Implementation of preannounced exchange rate was based on 
purchasing power parity and interest rate parity, on the assumption 
that in freely operating, competitive commodity and capital markets 
both would obtain rapidly. So, interest rates and inflation would 
be reduced, and consequently the reduced nominal interest rates 
would increase real money demand. Therefore, for a given level of 
monetary expansion and income level, increased money demand would 
stabilize prices, and stabilization would be obtained without any
12
recession.Especialiy in Argenzina and Uruguay, the tablita supposed 
to woi*k in this ivay. Howevei', in Chile, there were concerns about 
i n H a t  i onary pressures tliat might be created by capital inflows.
3.2. Turkey
Stabilization anci liberalization .policies in Turkey do not 
show a clear' d i .s t i no t.i on as in the case of Southern Cone. However, 
some autiiors have divided and studied them in thi'ee periods. They 
have attributed the third period, starting from November 1983 up 
to the present, as being oriented more of li beraili zati on policies.® 
Here, implemented policies are treated as a continuoum and no 
distinction is made among them.
3.2.1. Stabilization Policies
Since the initial conditions in Turkey were similar to those in 
Southern Cone countries, prescription by the IMF was similar too. 
Both expenditure reducing and switching policiés were used to 
stabilize the economy.?
The ratio of public sector deficit to GNP was 10 percent in 1980 
and iz was nearly halved to 5.4 percent in 1981. However, poor 
performance on tax revenue collections led the public sector 
deficit to reach 6.5 percentage points in 1984.
6 S e e  S ' ? n s e S i l 9 S » . ,  a n d  d z i $ , 1 9 S 5 ^
'  I n f o r m a t i o n  o n  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  p o l i c i e s  a s  w e l l  a s  o n
l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  p o l i c i e s  u n t i l  1 9 9 6  i s  m a i n l y  o b t a i n e d  f r o m
K o p i t s ,  1 9 9 7 .
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decreased to 14.1 of the GNP.
Thus, especially in initial years, most of the stabilization 
rested on the expenditure side, both for public and private. 
Public expenditures fell from 24.2 percent of the GNP in 1980 to 
19.2 percent of the GNP in 1985. However, public expenditures grew 
both in 1986 and 1987 to 20.3 and 21.8 percentage points. 
Restraining in expenditures was obtained mainly through a freeze on 
government employment, cuts in transfers to the State Economic 
Enterprises (SEEs) and public sector wage adjustments which fell 
short of inflation. In some expenditure items, however, there were 
sharp increases. Interest payments due to large amounts of external 
and internal borrowing, investment outlays - especially 
infrastructure, other transfers, (tax rebates for exporters and 
wage earners), and pension payments (Kopits,1987).
Quantitative limits on Central Bank credit and interest rates 
on bank deposits were the primary instruments used in implementing 
monetary policies. Growth of Central Bank credit to the public 
sector decelerated from 59 percent in 1980 to 5.4 percent in 1982 
(See Table 5). Lower public sector borrowing in combination with 
interest rate decontrol tightened the monetary growth between 1980 
and 1982. In 1982, however, monetary control was relaxed due to an 
increase of foreign assets at the Central Bank which resulted from 
an improvement in external payments and from banks' reluctance to 
obey reserve requirements after the financial crisis. The crisis 
itself arose mainly from the operations of uncontrolled nonbank 
financial intermediaries'. Inflation was reduced substantially, 
but, banks were in a severe liquidity sequeze. Thus, authorities 
encouraged banks to reduce time deposit interest rates. In late
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1983, inflation re-accelerated and authorities reinstated on tight 
money policies again by setting high ceilings on after-tax deposit 
rates. Assuming that inflation would decline, higher interest rates 
were set for faster maturing time deposits.
In Turkey, reserve requirement ratio was another important 
monetary tool. In January 1983, legal liquidity and reserve 
requirement ratios were simplified.Liquidity requirement ratios 
were unified at 10 percent and started to be monitored daily.Sight 
and time deposits, and various categories of credits were subject 
to varying reserve requirements and they were unified at 25 
percent. Two preferential reserve requirement ratios were 
reinstated in 1984, credits channelled to exports and for certain 
investments were subject to 5 percent and 10 percent less reserve 
requirement ratios, respectively. Again, in March 1985, reserve 
requirements were unified, but interest payments on reserves were 
abandoned. Foreign exchange deposits, legalized in 1983, were 
subject to reserve requirements but they acrued interest. In 1984, 
liquidity was build-up outside the control of the Central Bank duo 
to rapid accumulation of foreign exchange reserves. Also reserve 
money growth of the Central Bank has increased as a result of 
foreign exchange purchases from commercial banks. Several actions 
were taken to reduce monetary expansion (e.g. a 5 percent rise in 
liquidity requirement ratio). In 1985, Central Bank credit to the 
public sector was increased in order to refinance government 
securities bought by commercial banks in the previous year. In 1987 
Central Bank credit to the public was again expanded by 66 percent 
(See Table 5). Central Bank bought government securities from banks
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to build-up its paper stock in order to conduct more efficient 
open market operations. This raised liquidity of banks. Further,the 
reduction of reserve requirement ratio from 15 percent to 10 
percent, and the allowance for holding high shares of government 
securities in the form of liquidity reserves have strenghtened the 
liquidity position of the commercial banks. Central Bank has taken 
several actions to reduce liquidity, and reserve requirement ratio 
was risen to 12 percent in September and then to 14 percent in 
December 1987. At the same time liquidity ratio was increased to 22 
percent.
In 1987, demand for foreign exchange deposits and for foreign 
exchange holdings for transaction purposes rose continuously and 
exacerbated inflation. In order to reduce attractiveness of foreign 
exchange deposits. Central Bank introduced a 5 percent witholding 
tax on foreign exchange interest earnings. Due to accelerated 
inflation, restrictive policy measures were announced in February 
1988, which was called the "February 4th package". Both reserve 
requirement and liquidity ratios were further increased, the former 
was increased from 14 to 16 percent and the latter from 22 to 27 
percent. Interest rates were also increased, interest rate 
ceilings for one year time deposits and for sight deposits were set 
at 65 percent and 36 percent ,respectively. These policies aimed at 
tightening Turkish Lira and at shifting the demand from foreign 
currencies towards Turkish Lira. Interest rates on sight deposits 
were gradually reduced later on. However, all of these efforts were 
insufficient to shift the demand from foreign currencies, and in 
order to prevent the currency substitution, more restrictive 
measures were taken in October 1988. Banks were obliged to transfer
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their 25 percent of foreign exchange holdings to the Central Bank - 
paid in Turkish Lira equivalent. Interest rates were liberalized 
and started to rise. Nevertheless, Central Bank again intervened by 
setting a ceiling on one year time deposits at 85 percent in order 
to prevent excess offerings and their consequences on lending 
rates.
Another stabilization instrument used since 1980 was the 
exchange rate administration. Initially there was a substantial 
devaluation - 33 percent in January 1980. Thereafter exchange rate 
depreciation continued. Depreciation of exchange rate was assumed 
to serve for two purposes ; (1) to restrain domestic demand, and 
(2) to swich domestic demand from tradables to nontradables and 
output supply from nontradables to tradables. Exchange rates were 
more frequently adjusted after 1980, and since May 1981, daily 
announcements of exchange rate had been exercised. Depreciation of 
real exchange rate basically aimed to increase the competiveness of 
Turkish Lira against major industrial partner countries. Exchange 
rate, generally, served to stabilize external imbalances but it had 
inflationary pressures on the domestic market. Concerns about 
inflationary effects on domestic markets finaly led the Central 
Bank to intervene in foreign exchange markets more frequently since 
October 1988, and this led to the appreciation of Turkish Lira.®
0 T u r k i s h  Lira. a p p r e c i a t e d  b y  2 p e r c e n t  In Noveinber 1 9 0 0 «  
n e v e r t h e l e s s «  d a t a  tor D e c e m b e r  w a s  n o t  a v a i l a b l e  at t h e  t i m e  o t  
p r e p a r a t i o n  ot t h i s  s t u d y .  S o u r c e :  C B  M o n t h l y  S t a t i s t i c a l  a n d  
E v a l u a t i o n  B u l l e t i n .
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3.2.2. Liberalization Policies
With the aim of being more of a market oriented economy, reform 
programs included liberalization policies as well. Prices and 
interest rates were deregulated. Barriers on trade were reduced. 
However, labor market became from relatively free bargaining system 
to a strictly controlled system.
Private sector prices were deregulated and adjustments on the 
prices of basic commodities produced by State Economic Enterprises 
(SEEs) took place at first. The prices of only a few items 
continued to be controlled -especially petroleum, bread, coal, 
fertilizer and sugar. Price adjustments of SEEs continued to be 
implemented on cost basis since then. Agricultural pricing policy 
has changed from one of high subsidization of input and output 
prices to a more market oriented approach.
Interest ceilings on bank deposits were lifted in July 1980. 
Interest rates began to be determined freely. However, as a result 
of the oligopolistic structure of banking sector of Turkey, 
commercial banks practiced coming together and signed a 
"Gentlement's Agreement" for determining interest rates.® Although 
competition was not severe,real interest rates became positive 
between 1981 and 1983 (see Graph 3 in section 4). Tight monetary 
policy created excess demand for credit and this was met by 
brokerage firms mainly by trading CDs and corporate bonds. This
9 O E C D , 1 9 0 0  C p »00># a t t r i b u t e s  t h e  T u r k i s h  b a n k i n g  s e c t o r  a s
h a v l n s  an ollffopllstlc s t r u c t u r e  In th e  f o l l o w i n g  s t a t e m e n t .
....... t h e  e f f i c i e n c y  of the b a n k i n g  s e c t o r  h a s  s o m e w h a t  I m p r o v e d ,
a l t h o u g h  Ita oligopolistic Structure m u c h  c h a n g e d .  ··
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increased intensity of competition in the financial markets,and the 
offered interest rates exceeded those which were agreed-upon by 
commercial banks. In order to prevent excess offerings, in 1983,the 
nine largest commercial banks were bounded to follow common 
(aggreed-upon) interest rates. Others were allowed to pay a premium 
in excess of these rates. However, financial crisis started with 
the collapse of the Turkey's largest brokerage firm in late 1982 
and liquidity positions of the whole banking system was strained. 
Moreover, six banks collapsed, and they were taken over by the 
Agricultural Bank of Turkey.
In December 1983, the reluctance of banks to offer real 
positive rates led to the authorization of the Central Bank for 
the purpose of reviewing and determining ceilings on deposit rates 
at least every three months. As a result, interest rate ceilings on 
time deposits rose above the rate of inflation, but accelerated 
inflation did not bear positive real rates in the course of 1984. 
In 1987, one-year deposit rates were deregulated assuming that 
competition would push the rates up and funds would be attracted 
into these medium-term deposits. However, the lack of competition 
among banks and high rate of inflation lowered the real rate and 
funds did not flow into one year deposits, instead deposits in 
short maturity increased. In February 1988, by tightening monetary 
policy,interest rates were increased and interest rates on sight 
deposits and one year time deposits became 36 percent and 65 
percent, respectively. A third attempt in liberalizing interest 
rates was made in October 1988, but it did not last long and 
Central Bank intervened again by setting a ceiling on one-year time 
deposit rate at 85 percent.
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At this point, it would make sense to give some information 
about the structure of the financial system in Turkey. Turkey's 
financial system is still undeveloped and banks are dominant in 
this sector. Efforts to develop a real functioning capital market 
was made since 1980, but these efforts were not sufficient to 
achive the desired developments in this respect. Previously, banks 
were under-capitalized and this was one of the reasons that 
prevented the development of the sector (OECD,1988). Major banking 
regulations started in 1983 , after the financial crisis. In 1985, 
a new banking law was legislated. The law obliges banks to apply 
standardized accounting and reporting systems and to submit their 
reports periodically to the Central Bank. Minimum capital 
requirements were determined and the required amount was increased 
several times in order to be adjusted for inflation.The latest 
increase was in March 1988 when the capital requirement was doubled 
from TL 2.5 billion to TL 5 billion. Also, a savings insurance 
scheme was introduced and banks were obliged to buy minimum 
insurance coverage for savings deposits from Savings Deposit 
Insurance Fund, which operates under the control of the Central 
Bank. The law also contains external auditing requirements and from 
1987 on, banks were audited by external auditors.Another important 
development in this context was the creation and activation of an 
interbank money market in March 1986.
Apart from initial devaluations and frequent adjustments since 
May 1981, most of foreign exchange market liberalization efforts
10 F o r  m o r e  I n f o r m a t i o n  on t h e  s t r u c t u r e  of f i n a n c i a l  s e c t o r  In 
T u r k e y «  se e  O H C D « 1 9 0 8 . « a n d  I n s e l b a ^  & G U l t e k l n «  1 0 8 6 .
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started in 1983. In that year, the holding of foreign exchange 
sight deposits was legalized for exporters. In January 1984, the 
holding of foreign exchange deposits, both sight and time deposits, 
was legalized for the whole residents. Banks were allowed to engage 
foreign exchange transactions and to determine their own exchange 
rates within 8 percent upper and lower limits of Central Bank rate. 
The latter was removed in July 1985, but again in March 1986, it 
was set as 1 percent. Frequent adjustments were made in these 
limits. In July 1988, for example, limits were set as 0.5 percent 
for banknotes and 2 percent for foreign exchanges for transactions 
up to $ 50.000, and free determination was allowed for transactions 
exceeding this amount. After a short time, in September 1988, these 
limits were changed as 0.2 percent and 1 percent, respectively. 
Additionally, banks were allowed to participate in exchange rate 
determination. In this context, simplification and ease of foreign 
travel for residents and investments for foreign enterpreneours 
are the points which great advances had been achieved in the course 
of reform program. A remarkable point is that, foreign exchange 
deposits gained a great acceptance by residents and these deposits 
grew rapidly. In 1986, 9.3 percent of domestic financial assets
were in the form of foreign exchange deposits (OECD, 1988).‘. 
Consequently, Central Bank took several measures in order to 
prevent the shift towards foreign currencies: introduction of 5
percent witholding tax on foreign exchange interest earnings and 
continuosly increased reserve requirements -25 percent since 
February 1988- were some measures which served in this purpose.
On the foreign trade liberalization side, most of the
quantitative restrictions abolished. These were the most effective
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bairiers to free trade. Previously, commodities were classified in 
two Quota List, Liberalization List I and Liberalization List II, 
under an annual import program. Only one sixth of total value of 
exports were exempt from quantitative restrictions (Kopits, 1987). 
Intei-est free advance deposit requirements., tariffs, tarifflike 
charges were the other restrictions on imports. Import restrictions 
riad also adverse affects on exports. Adverse affects of over\alued 
exchange rate on exports, to some extent,, compensated by tcix 
rebates, preferential credits and foreign exchange allocation. 
Licencing had negative affects on exports, too.
At the beginning of the program, in order to reduce trade 
restrictions advance deposit requirements were cut as a first step. 
Deposit requirements become 15-20 percent for industrial and 20-30 
percent for commercial imports. Import regulations were simplified. 
In 1981, the quota list was abolished. Deposit requirements were 
lowered further to 10 percent for industrial and 20 percent for 
commercial imports.
In 1984, import regime was further liberalized. Two lists were 
abolished and three lists - Prohibited List, List of Imports 
Subject to Permission and Fund List - were created. Commodities out 
of these lists were imported freely as long as tariffs had been 
paid.i^ During 1985, the number of items in the Prohibited List 
were reduced from 500 to 3 items, which are narcotics, weapons and 
ammunition. Also, the number of items in the Permission List was 
reduced fi*om 1000 to 245. By the end of 1985,deposit requirement 
rates were reduced to 1 percent and 3 percent for industrial and
1 1  F o r  a g e n e r a l  r e v i e w  o f  1 9 S 4  I m p o r t  R e g i m e ,  s e e  S e n s e s ,  1 9 % 4 .
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commercial imports, respectively. In 1987, liberalization of imports 
continued to some extent. Tariffs on some imported goods and the 
number of goods subject to import licencing (Permission List) were 
reduced, the latter containing only 111 items. However, surcharges 
were increased from 4 to 6 percent in December 1987. The number of 
goods subject to permission was further reduced to 33 items in 
January 1988. Also , tariff cuts were provided for imports of raw 
material and stump duty was lowered to 5 percent. At the same time, 
however, advance deposit requirements were increased to 7 percent. 
Moreover,they were temporarily increased to 15 percent as a part of 
"February 4th package". Import liberalization continued later by 
reducing custom duties and surcharges and also by excluding the raw 
material imports for export oriented investments and goods used for 
investments in development priority regions from the list of goods 
subject to surcharge. Nevertheless, in October 1988, some 
restrictive measures were taken in this front. Advance deposit 
requirements and surcharges were increased to 15 percent and 10 
percent, respectively. The former will be effective until April 
1989.
On the export front, incentives were increased initially and in 
1984, licencing requirements and export price controls were 
eliminated. Export tax rebates were increased from 9 percent, on 
average,in 1980 to 23 percent in 1984. Tax rebates were cut back, 
thereafter, 8 percent at the beginning of 1986, and tax rebates 
were eliminated for textiles. However,in response to slow growth 
and even a decline in exports, export incentives reintroduced in 
the second half of 1986 and remained effective during 1987. In 
February 1988, in order to encourage exporters to transfer their
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export earnings without delay a premium -120 percent of regular 
rate- was granted for export earnings transferred within 30 days 
and penalties, such as reductions on regular rate were used for 
export earnings transferred after 30 days but within 90 days. No 
tax rebate was granted for the export earnings which are not 
returned within 90 days. In compliance with GATT agreements, export 
tax rebates were gradually reduced starting in April 1988, and were 
completely abolished by the end of year. Instead, a preferantial 
credit system will be used as an export incentive after January 
1989. Foreign allocation and retention schemes, tariff and income 
tax preferences were the other incentives used for exporters in the 
course of reform programs.Additionally, exchange rate policy became 
an important motivating instrument for exporters. Exchange rate 
policy aimed to increase competitivenes through substantial 
devaluations initially, and through daily adjustments later on.
As stated previously, while liberalizing other constituents of 
the economy, labor market became strictly regulated one. In 
September 1980, High Arbitration Council was established and wage 
determination for the public sector at the national level was made 
by the council. Determined wage increases also were guidelines for 
private sector. Since 1985, collective bargaining process was 
liberalized again and the role of council has been limited to areas 
where strikes are forbidden by law.
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4 . OUTCOMES OF THE REFORM PROGRAMS 
4.1. Outcomes in the Southern Cone
Phase 1 policies in each country was relatively successful!. 
Inflation had been reduced to moderate rates. However, they were 
still at disturbing rates. Despite a. terms of trade loss, 
Argentina's exports grew by 29.9 percent during Phase 1. Growth of 
exports helped to reduce the current account deficit and even to 
achieve a surplus of 2.1 percent of the GDP between 1976-1978 (See 
Table 1). Real wages fell by 35 percent in Phase 1 period. Increase 
in unemployment was only 1 percent because of political concerns 
about employment. Inflation rate was reduced from 443.2 percent in 
1976 to 168.6 percent in 1978 (See Table 2 for 1978, the figure 
for 1986 is obtained from Corbo, et.al.,1987 ). This high inflation 
could be explained by public sector deficits which were increased 
from 10.1 percent of GDP for the years 1973-75 to 11.6 peroent of 
GDP for Phase 1 period. GDP growth was the smallest among the three 
countries, 0.8 percent annual growth, that was smaller than the 
prereform period. Although, in Phase 1, gross investment in 
proportion to GDP was higher than the prereform period, in real 
terms it was -1.1 percent less.
In Uruguay, GDP growth reached from -0.4 percent of prereform 
period average to 4.3 percent average for Phase 1. This increase 
was mainly due to growth of exports despite the fact that terms of 
trade was severely deteriorated. ( See Table 1) , Growth of exports 
was obtained by incentives for nontraditional exports and less 
volatile real exchange rates after a passive crawling peg regime. 
Also, decrease in real wages (by reducing costs and in turn
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TABLE 1
MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS, SOUTHERN CONE COUNTRIES
COUNTRY
Import Prerefora
Substitution crisis
period
Reforas
Phase 1 Phase 2
INDICATOR
Post
refor·
1965-70 1971-73 1974-76 1977-78 1979-81 1982-83
4.1 0.5 -1.8 7.8 6.9 -7.4
5.1 1.3 -8.2 11.9 10.2 -14.4
11.8 9.9 23.5 7.9 20.4 -0.1
8.1 5.6 22.3 35.2 28.7 -30.2
5.3 -9.8 -7.8 16.7 17.8 -26.6
23.3 149.7 358 79 30.2 11.7
2.1 16.1 5.1 1.3 -2.1 3.1
6 4.6 14.2 13.6 12.2 22.2
98 98 69 82 100 82
14.4 12.1 16 14 16.7 13.3
101.4 92.7 79 60.3 56.1 42.5
1.4 2,9 2.6 5.6 9.1 7.4
CHILE: Average Annual Growth
- - - - -  GDP
Expenditure 
Exports (valued in $) 
laports (valued in $) 
Gros fixed investient 
Consuaer prices 
Average level 
Fiscal deficit/GDP 
Uneaployaent (percent) 
Real wage (1969=130) 
Gross Investaent/GDP 
Tens of Trade(1968=100) 
C. Acc. Deficit/GDP
URUGUAY: Average Annual Growth
- - - - -  GDP 2.1 -0.4 4.3 3.2 4.7 -7.2
Expenditure 2.9 -0.2 1.9 3.6 5.6 -11.2
Exports (valued in %) 3.9 16.8 21.4 10.2 21.8 -2.9
laports (valued in %) 3.9 8.7 30.2 14 32.1 -30.7
Gros fixed investaent 7.3 -10.8 25 10.5 6.9 -24.8
Consuaer prices 49.8 62.7 69.2 51.3 54 33.3
Average level
Fiscal deficit/GDP 1.9 3.2 3.8 1.9 0 6.4
Uneaployaent (percent) 8.2 8.1 9.7 12.4 8.4 13.7
Real wage (1969=100) 104 102 86 70 64 54
Gross Investaent/GOP 11.3 10.1 13 15.6 16.2 13.5
Teras of Trade(1968=100) 107.2 134.9 76 90.7 89 80.3
C. Acc. Deficit/GDP 0.05 -0.5 3.4 3.2 5.4 0.7
ARGENTINA 1965-73 1974-75 1976-78 1979-8B 1981-83
Average Annual Growth
GDP 4.2 2.9 0.8 0.9 -3
Expenditure 4.2 3.3 -1.6 3.4 -6.1
Exports (valued in $) 11.5 21.3 29.9 2.7 -33.5
laports (valued in $) 9 29.6 2.1 55.8 -15.6
Gros fixed investaent 2.6 7.6 -1.1 -4 -3
Consuaer prices 29.9 138.7 225.5 100.8 188.5
Average level
Public Sector Deficit/GDP 3.7 10.1 11.6 10.1 17.8
Uneaployaent (percent) 5.7 2.4 3.4 2.2 4.7
Real wage (1969=100) 125 154 100 118 111
Gross Investient/GDP 19.1 21.4 26.4 22.8 17.2
Teras of ТгаЬе(1968=100) 120.1 133.4 89 86.5 84
C. Acc. Deficit/GDP 0.2 1.5 -2.1 1.8 1.8
Source : Corbo et.al.,1986., Corbo h de Melo, 1987.
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increasing competitiveness), and also implemented expenditure 
switching policies helped to increase exports ( Corbo & de Helo 
1987). Increase in gross investment, from 10.1 percent of GDP for 
the years 1971-73 to 13.0 percent of GDP in Phase 1 was another 
element which contributed to GDP growth. Capital inflows had also 
an impact on this noteworthy change.
In Chile, there was a severe recession in the first year of the 
program. Fiscal deficit was cut from 16.1 percent to 5.1 percent 
and as a result, the decline in the growth of GDP was 8.3 percent. 
Thus, the average growth of GDP became -1.8 percent for the years 
1974-76. However, recovery in the economy had been achieved between 
1977-78, and GDP growth was 7.8 percent on average. Exports grew at 
an average of 23.5 percent between 1974-76 and 7.9 percent between 
1977-78. Fiscal deficit was further reduced to 1.3 percent of GDP 
for the years 1977-78. Gross investments declined by 7.8 percent in 
Phase 1 and unemployment rose from 4.6 percent to 14 percent. Thus, 
growth of GDP was a result of increased capacity utilization and 
improved productivity. Despite big reductions in the fiscal deficit 
(even there was a surplus at the beginning of Phase 2), reduction 
in inflation was slow and real interest rates were extra-ordinarily 
high (See Table 2),There was a fall in real wages between 1974-76. 
However, as a result of indexation, real wages increased between 
1977-78 and in Phase 2 years (1979-81).
During Phase 2 period, Uruguay's fiscal deficit was zero on 
average. Output growth was 4.7 percent, increase in expenditures 
was 5.6 percent and the gap between output growth and expenditures 
was filled by foreign finance, leading to appreciation of exchange 
rate. Demand on nontradables lead to culmination of inflationary
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pressures and inflation rose from 43.3 percent in 1973 to TS-7 
percent in 1979, thereafter inflation was reduced to 30 fercest 35 
1981. In Chile, inflation rate was reduced to 11 percent in Í9S2. 
but currency appreciation was large. Argentina was able to reduce 
inflation only at a rate of 89 percent by 1980. Current accotant 
deficit rose in all countries; in Argentina it went from 2.1 perce©t 
surplus to 1.8 percent deficit. In Chile, deficit rose from 3.2 
percent to 5.4 percent and in Uruguay from 5.6 percent to 9.1 
percent. Increased current account deficit was a result of faster 
increase in imports than exports. Because of currency appreciation, 
prices of imported goods became cheaper and import demand
increased. Meanwhile, exports decelerated as a result of loss in 
competetiveness due to currency appreciation. Inconsistencies in 
economic policies increased the foreign debt in all countries. 
Argentina's ongoing 10 percent public sector deficit was financed 
by external funds and exchange rate policy,the "tablita", became 
unsustainable in early 1980. Doubts about exchange rate policies 
were increased by the collapse of Banco de Intercambio Regional.
Uruguay's fiscal deficit started to rise after 1981, at the 
same time real exchange rate appreciated sharply and doubts on the 
sustainability of exchange rate policy emerged. In Chile,
increasing indebtness was not a result of fiscal deficits, but it 
was mainly due to increased spread between domestic borrowing and 
foreign borrowing. Foreign borrowing was more profitable since real 
domestic interest rates were very high (See Table 2). High spreads 
between external and internal interest rates contributed to the 
shift of firms on various arbitrage operations, firms started to
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TABLE 2
EXCHANGE RATES, PRICES AND INTEREST RATES DURING TABLITA PERIOD (PHASE 2)
Real Exchange
COUNTRY Rate Index Real Interest Ex-Post
Years Inflation (1978=100)m Rate P/$ Spread
CHILE 1977 67.1 103.1 58 44.8
1978 32 101.1 43.8 32.3
1979 38.2 108.9 17.1 22.6
1980 31.3 102.6 13.1 28.1
1981 11.5 80.6 39.9 28.5
1982 21.1 87.1 51.1 5.9
URUGUAY 1977 59.2 100.1 4.5 23
1978 43.3 97.5 22.5 18.5
1979 79.7 80.5 -7.6 19.7
1980 50.1 59 11.7 17.5
1981 30.1 49 23.6 16.2
1982 15.1 63 37.7 -17.9
ARGENTINA 1977 172.5 153.2 0.1 24.4
1978 m .b 111.5 8.9 80.9
1979 152.2 88.9 3.5 53.3
1980 89 59.2 21.3 56.9
1981 125.9_ 73.4 15.7 -562.8
1982 225 n.a n.a n.a
Note : A decline leans appreciation. 
Source : Corbo et.al.(1987).
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explore quick profit opportunities rather than being concerned with 
their real activities. Wage indexation even worsened the 
possibilities for the exchange rate to recover and decreased 
credibility of the tablita policy. When it became apparent that 
tablita policy would no longer be sustainable,huge amounts of 
capital outflows occured leading to the financial crisis in all 
countries. Finally, both Chile and Uruguay abandoned tablita policy 
in June 1982 and in November 1982 , respectively.
Private capital outflows reduced domestic demand, and in turn 
led to big recessions in all countries. Sticky prices of 
nontradables and wages exacerbated recession. Decline in domestic 
output was 7.2 percent in Uruguay, 7.4 percent in Chile and 3 
percent in Argentina between 1982-83.
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4.2. Outcomes of the reform policies in Turkey
There was a small recession in the first year of the program. 
Domestic demand fell by 1.2 percent, investments fell by 10 percent 
and consequently, the fall in GNP was 1.1 percent (See Table 3). As 
a result of major price adjustments and a 33 percent devaluation, 
prices increased by 118 percent in the first quarter of the year 
(See Kopits,1987).
TABLE 3
HAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS, TURKEY 
Prereforin period Reform Period
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1933 1984 1985 1986 1987 13S8(·
Annual Percentage Change
Rea) GNP 3.9 2.9 -0.4 -1.1 4.1 4.6 3.3 5.9 5.1 8.1 7.4 6.5
Domestic Demand 4.5 -5.4 -2.2 -1.2 1.6 2.8 4.7 5.5 4.5 10.9 6.5 7.5
Consumer Prices [11 28.5 53.6 75.1 90.3 34.1 27.4 28.1 46.4 41.7 27.5 39.3 77
GNP deflator 24.5 43.7 71.1 105.7 41.9 27.2 28 49.9 43.6 30.6 38.2 66
Interest Rates [2] 
(Average Ann. Rate)
4.8 6.6 9 10.8 34.5 37.5 30 44.8 45.9 41 34.2 52
In Percentages of GNP
Fiscal Deficit 3.9 1.9 3 3.7 1.8 2,8 2.6 5.3 2.8 3,5 4.4 3.9
Public Sector Deficit 11,3 10.5 8.5 10 5.4 5 5.2 5.5 4.9 4.5 3.3 ,,,
Expenditures 24.7 26.3 27 24.2 22.9 21.6 21.9 20.3 19.2 20.3 21.9 20.3
Tax Revenue 17.3 19.9 13.4 15.9 13.1 17.9 16.7 12.9 13.9 15.2 15.5
Gross Investment 20.5 20.6 21.6 19.4 19.1 18.9 19.2 18.2 19.5 22.3 23.7 HI
Gross National Savings 18.5 16.1 16.2 15.5 18.1 18.4 16 15.7 13.1 22 23.5 24.9
Unemoloymentlpercent) 12.1 12.4 13.6 14.3 15.2 15.6 16.1 16.1 15.3 15.3 15.2 U . i
Real Mage (1378:100) [3] 98.6 100 80.8 64.6 D u · 2 58.3 62.2 58.8 65.8 64 52.4 U . 7
Notes : 1 Istanb'ji Ciiamber of Commerce Indices (1963:100 )
2 After tax 5 month time deposit
3 313 average wage series deflated by consumer prices. However,publication of this index was 
stopped after 19S4, so wage increases after that year obtained from 0ECD( 1988i J TU3IAD'(1989)
» P rovisional
SourcetOECD (1988), Kopits (1987), SIS Statistical Yearbook of Turkey (1981)
TUSIAO,1989.,SPO Main Economic Indicators
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In 1980,Large devaluations enabled exports to increase by 28 
percent. However, as a result of 22.7 percent decline in the terms 
of trade, import bill increased twice as much as export receipts 
(56 percent. See Table 4). Therefore, current account deficit 
worsened, and it rose from 2 percent of the GNP in 1979 to 5.8 
percent of the GNP in 1980. This could be attributed as a typical 
example of J curve effect of a devaluation. After this small 
recession, recovery in the economy was noteworthy. Exports 
increased by 61.6 percent, and lead to 4 .1 percent growth of 
output in 1981. Inflation was reduced to 42 percent in 1981, and 
further to 27.2 percent in 1982. Also, output growth was 4.6 
percent in 1982.
TABLE 4
SELECTED EXTERNAL ECONOHIC INDICATORS, TURKEY
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
(In HillionsI of US dollars)
Exportslfob) 1753 2288 2261 2910 4703 5746 5727 7380
Iiport5(cif)[1] 5797 4599 5069 7909 8933 8843 9235 10331
C. Acc. Deficit/SNP 6.5 2.4 2 5 3.3 1.7 3.7 2.8
(Annual Percentage Change)
Exports -10.6 30.5 -1.2 28.7 61.6 25.2 0.3 25.1
Inports 13 -20.7 10.2 56 12.9 -1 4.4 16.5
Tens of Trade -0.6 -7 -0.3 -22.7 -8.6 -0.6 -6 0.6
Real Eff. Exchange Rate 1.1 -3.8 12.7 -22.8 1.9 -11.4 -1.9 -2.1
1.9 2.i 1.4 -0.03
11.7 -6.7 36.6 15.2 
8 -2.1 27.5 7.6
1.2 9.3 0.1 ....
-0.1 -13.2 -1 -8.6
Notes : 1 In 1984 Presentation of Balance of Payaents chanced, after 1984 figures 
corresponds to пен series (fob).
I Provisional.
I» As of Septeaber 1988.
Sources : OECD (1988), Kopits (1987), SPO Main Econoaic Indicators.
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Deregulated interest rates and reduced inflation led to the 
positive real interest rates between 1981 and 1983, and national 
saving increased from 15.6 percent of GNP in 1980 to 18.4 percent 
of GNP in 1982. This, resulted to a slight increase in fixed 
capital investments. However, in private manufacturing investments, 
there was a continous decline until 1984. Additionally, in the 
public sector, reduction in manufacturing investments continued 
until 1988, except for the year 1985 (See Table 5 below).
TABLE 5
1 N V E S T H E N T S
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988(1)
(Annual percentage change , In real tens)
Fixed Capital Investaents,total 9.9 -10 -3.6 -10 1.7 3.5 3 0.1 16.7 11.4 5.5 3.7
Public Sector 14.8 -13.7 4.6 -3.7 9.4 1 1.9 -5.3 23.1 8.3 -3.4 -8
Private Sector -1.5 -6 -11.6 -17.3 -8.7 5.5 4.7 8.4 8.2 16.4 19 17.7
Manufacturing Investients
Public Sector ■ · · ... 23.5 9.7 -8.5 -15.9 -3.3 -17.4 6.8 -19.6 -41.4 -17.9
Private Sector • · · ... -31.8 -14.1 -2 0.6 1 5.9 6 13.2 -4.2 3.1
Note : } Provisional
Sources : OECD (1988), UCCINCET (1987), SPO Main Econoiic Indicators
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Despite considerable decline in manufacturing
investments, exports continued to rise until 1985, stagnated iTi 
1906, and than again continued to increase. Also, the composition 
of exports changed in favor of industry, 79.1 percent of exports in 
1987. Growth of exports and imports during the reform program, 
along with the current account deficit to GNP ratio, are depicted 
in Graph 1. Also, the composition of exports for the years 1980 and 
1987, as material of comparison, are shown in Graph 2.
Looking at a decline in manufacturing investments, one can 
conclude that increased exports was not a result of productivity 
increase, and in fact it was a result of increased capacity 
utilization. OECD Economic Report (1988) estimates a productivity 
increase of 2.6 and 3.4 percent, on average, for the periods 
1981-84 and 1985-87, respectively. Most of this increase was 
accounted for by an improvement in the labor productivity. These 
results are biased and misleading, because productivity estimates 
do not take care of relative price changes. Therefore, this can be 
interpreted as neither a productivity improvement nor a technical 
progress. This was a cost advantage provided by strict controls on 
labor markets. Productivity improvement and/or technical progress, 
to some extent, may have resulted from the replacement of capital 
stock enabled by liberalized imports.
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GRAPH 1
GROWTH OF EXPORTS & IMPORTS and CURRENT 
ACCOUNT DEF. TO GNP RATIO
%  CHANGE IN EXP& IMP and CUR.AX.DEF/QNP
1
-20
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
YEAR
Export M  Import C.A Def/GNP
Source : Derived from Table 4
GRAPH 2
COMPOSITION OF EXPORTS ( 19S0 4  1087 )
1980
Source: SPO Main Ecooanc Indicators.
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In 1983, domestic demand rose more than the output, 4.7 
percent and 3.3 percent, respectively, and this resulted to 
accelerated inflation. Inflation rose from 27 percent in 1982 to 
28 and 49.9 percentage points for the years 1983 and 1984, 
respectively. This, in turn led to a decline in savings as real 
interest rates became negative in 1984. Major source of increased 
domestic demand was increased public sector expenditures and the 
relaxed monetary policy. Public sector deficit rose from 5.4 
percent of GNP in 1981 to 6.5 percent of GNP in 1984. In the same 
year, money supply increased by 56 percent (See Table 6 below).
TABLE 6
HONETARY INDICATORS
Money supply
198B 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988(t) 
( Annual Percentage Change)
HI 58.3 38 38 44.7 16.1 42.4 56.3 64.7 33.9
H2 67 85.6 56 28.7 57.4 57.3 43 41.6 41.1
CB Credit, total 71.5 41.3 -2 35.5 31.6 32.2 30.1 71.5 33.7
to the public 59.5 32.3 5.4 11.6 27.2 44.4 28.1 66 33.2
to the private 96.8 56.7 -11.9 77.2 -18.6 11.2 36.4 83.1 34.9
Bank Credits 57.1 67 36.9 33.9 30.3 76.8 80.5 59.5 35.6
Net Credit Voluiie 58.2 55.2 29.6 28.4 23.5 68.1 73.7 59.1 31.9
Note : t Provisional
Source : 3P0 Main Econoiic Indicators
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In 1983 and in 1984, savings dropped to 16 percentage points. 
Increased export incentives resulted for a 25 percent increase in 
exports and this in turn led to 5.9 percent growth of output in
1984. Also, the rise in exports and output continued in 1985. In
1985, real positive interest rates reemerged and savings increased 
to 18.1 percentage points. Behaviour of real interest rates and 
savings since the beginning of the reform program is depicted 
in Graph 3, below.
GRAPH 3
REAL INTEREST RATES and SWINGS 
DURING 1980s
1981 1982 1983 19801984 1985
Year
Real Int. Rates Savings/GNP
1987 1988
Source :Derived trom Table 3.
Note : R.lnt. Rato -Nom.lnt. Rate -  GPI
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In 1986, real growth in domestic demand was less than the 
growth of output due to positive real interest rates, and hence 
increased savings. Therefore, inflation fell a bit in that year. In 
the same year, exports -Turkey's most succesful recovery tool- fell 
by 6 .7 percent , mostly due to reduced incentives. As a result the 
current account deficit to GNP ratio rose to 3 percent, while it 
was only 1.9 percent a year earlier. Despite the slow down of 
exports, the real domestic demand rose by 10.9 percent and lead to 
output growth of 8.1 percent in that year, meanwhile reaccelerating 
inflation from 31 percentage points to 40 percentage points towards 
the end of 1987. The rise in inflation was also a result of 
increased public sector expenditures, leading to 8.3 percent public 
sector deficit, and of relaxed monetary policy. Central Bank Credit 
to the public grew by 66 percent,total credits by 71 percent and 
money supply (HI) by 64 percent in 1987 (See Table 6 ). Recovery in 
exports was achieved soon by 36.6 and 15.2 percent increases in 
1987 and 1988, respectively. Nevertheles, the trend of the rising 
inflation continued during 1988. At the end of 1988, officially 
announced inflation was 75.2 percent. Also, output growth had 
decelerated since 1986. GNP growth became 7.4 and 5.2 percent in 
1987 and 1988, respectively. “
In sum, recovery of the economy was mainly achieved by 
increased exports. Turkish economy made great advances in terms of 
outward-oreiantation and openness. Export volume nearly quadrupled 
since 1980, and together with the increase in imports Turkey's
11 A l t h o u g h  p r o v i s i o n a l  d a t a  p r e s e n t e d  in T a b l e  3 d e p i c t s  6 . 5  
g r o w t h  r a t e .  O j Pflclally a n n o u n c e d  g r o w t h  r a t e  in e a r l y  1 9 0 9  w a s  5 . 2
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foreign trade volume became 35 percent of the GNP. This is a 
remarkable development when it is compared to 1980's 19.5 percent 
value. The remarkable increase in exports was achieved through cost 
reductions (e.g. significant decline in real wages), real exchange 
rate depreciation and high incentives to export sector. However all 
of these sources have adverse affects too. Firstly, much of the 
burden of reform packages fell on wage earners and real wages 
declined so much that there is no room for further reduction in 
wages. When it is combined with the increased unemployment, welfare 
effect of the reform program on wage and salary earners might 
become questionable. Secondly, real exchange rate depreciation 
increased competiveness of Turkish Lira, but meanwhile increased 
the burden of foreign debt since the cost of debt servicing 
increases in terms of domestic currency as the exchange rate 
depreciates. This burden fell on public sector or central 
government actually, because much of foreign debt is owned by 
central government and local governments. Thirdly, high incentives 
created opportunities for unfair profits, fictions exports 
increased such that they accounted nearly to 10 percent of exports. 
Fortunatelly, corrective actions were taken in this front. In order 
to prevent this phenomena, also in line with international 
aggrements (GATT), authorities gradually reduced incentives in the 
cour.?e of 1988, and effective from 1989 on, no tax rebate will be 
granted to exports.The only incentive will be preferential export 
credit implementation by the Turkish Export-Import bank.
.Another important development is that, although investments 
rose a bit, manufacturing investments fell sharply. Most of 
investments went on tourism, housing and infrastructure which are
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not actually productive sectors. Total private sector investments 
rose by 19 and 17.7 percent in 1987 and 1988, respectively, but a 
great portion, 44 percent in 1987, of these investments went on 
housing in order to benefit from the incentives provided by 
government sponsored- mass housing programme. Public sector 
investments, on the other hand, had become dense in energy and 
transport & communication sectors, both accounting more than 50 
percent of investments in the public sector. As a typical example, 
sectoral distribution of gross fixed investments in 1987 are given 
in Table 7, below.
TABLE 7
DISTRIBUTION OF INVESTMENTS BY SECTORS, 1987 
( In Millions of TL)
Sectors
Public Sector Private Sector Total
TL 1 Share i TL 1 Share : TL :1 Share
Agriculture 681.8 9.0 ; 418.0 b.b : 1099.8 7.9
Hinig 286.2 3.8 : 96.8 1.5 ; 383.0 2.8
Manufacturing 461.5 6.1 ; 1650.3 26.1 ;: 2111.8 15.2
Energy 1838.7 24.4 : 59.0 i.9 1; 1897.7 13.7
Transport! Coiiunica. 2462.1 32.6 : 746.8 11.8 !: 3208.9 23.1
Touri:· 18B.9 2.4 : 241.0 3.8 ! 421.9 3.0
Housing 113.1 1.5 : 2795.1 44.1 1 2908.2 20.9
Education 240.2 3.2 : 37.0 1.6 ! 277.2 2.0
Health 106.2 1.4 : 46.1 0.7 : 152.3 1.1
Other Services 1179.3 15.6 ! 246.0 3.9 : 1425.3 10.3
Sub total 7550.0 100.0 !; 6336.1 100.0 : 13886.1 100.0
Percentage Share in Total 54.4 11; 45.6 11 100.0
Source : SPO Main Econoaic Indicators
Despite positive real interest rates,though sometimes were 
negative, savings did not increase much and government finally 
imposed a compulsary saving scheme in 1988. It seems that, the 
implemented program would increase gross national savings in the
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coming years at a rate sufficient to finance investments 
domestically rather than relying on foreign debt. However.until 
1988, public institutions was heavily dependent on external 
resources in financing their expenditures. Host of public sector 
investments were financed by foreign debt. The need for foreign 
money increased further with the need for the fresh money to 
service the existing debt. Despite considerable increase in 
foreign exchange earnings, enormously increased Debt Service Ratio, 
from 24 percent in 1980 to 40 percent in 1987, is the best 
indicator of this phenomena. As a result of financing investments 
and servicing the existing debt with foreign borrowing, foreign 
debt increased from $16 billion in 1980 to $38 billion in 1987. 
Moreover, a great portion of the debt consists of short term 
debts.Total external debt to GNP ratio increased from 28 percent to 
56 percent in 1987 and doubts about a debt crisis increased. 
Foreign debt indicators of Turkey, for the period 1980-1988, are 
given in Table 8 .
TABLE 8
EXTERNAL DEBT INDICATORS OF TURKEY
1988 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988(1)
External Debt
( In milions of US dollars)
16227 16861 17619 18385 21258 25349 31228 38384 36444
of which; Short Tern 2505 2194 1764 2278 3180 4759 6911 8692 8159
Med.lcLong Ter· 13722 14667 15855 16104 18078 20590 24317 29617 28285
Heiorandui iteas;
Private Sector Debt, total 1250 1605 1615 1792 2602 3709 4942 5810 5660
of which; Short Ter· 489 522 475 655 1782 2844 3985 4570 4441
- Credits 489 522 475 572 1238 2120 2735 2825 2691
- Deposits 0 0 0 83 544 724 1250 1745 1750
Short ten Debt/Total D. 15.4 13 10 12.4 15 18.8 22.1 22.7 22.8
Total Debt/GNP 25 28.6 32.8 35.9 43.1 48.1 53.5 56.6 50.2
Debt Service Ratio 24 22.4 25.5 29 25.7 28.8 36.3 32.8 40.6
Note; I As of Septeaber 28,1989.
Sources; OECD (1988), Kopits (1987), CB Nonthly Statistical and Evaluation Bulletin.
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5. EVALUATION OF THE REFORM POLICIES IN 
THE SOUTHERN CONE EXPERINCE
THE LIGHT OF
After the failure of Southern Cone Countries' stabilization 
and liberalization efforts, these policies were studied 
extensively. Much of these studies were focused on the timing and 
sequencing of reforms, the choice of exchange rate regime, the 
order of external liberalization, macroeconomic management and 
implementation problems, financial market deregulation, policy 
inconsistencies, committment and credibility issues. I will try to 
evaluate the Turkish stabilization and liberalization policies with 
respect to these issues.
Given economic circumstances presented in section 1, 
undoubtly the introduction of January 24th reform program as a 
whole, was timely or it could even be said that it was late if 
previous stabilization attempts would not have taken place. The 
first aim of the reform program was to remove external and internal 
imbalances through liberalization policies. Demand was restrained 
and a large devaluation took place at first. At the same time, 
prices were adjusted and deregulated. Some measures in foreign 
trade and domestic financial market liberalization came afterwards. 
All of these were in line with the emerging concensus on 
implementing this kind of reform policies. As pointed out by Corbo 
and de Melo (1987), countries with rapid inflation face 
complications if they try to implement stabilization and 
liberalization policies simultaneously. First, success of 
stabilization depends on restricting the economy as a whole. 
However, liberalization have expansionary effects on export-
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oriented sectors and contractionary effects on previously protected 
import-substituting firms. Thus, simultaneous application would 
bring too much contractionary effects on import-substituting firms. 
Their second argument is related to the downward inflexibility of 
prices. To cope with this, trade liberalization should be 
accompanied by an initial devaluation in order to achieve the 
necessary improvement in the relative prices of tradables. However, 
they argue that a devaluation pushes up prices of imports and 
therefore accelerates inflation.
They support their argument by pointing out that "succesful 
liberalization depends on credibility and having a stable and 
competitive real exchange rate". They give the examples of other 
economists, for instance Fischer and Sachs, that concluded in the 
similar way - "stabilization must precede liberalization". Mussa 
(1987) points out the same difficulties but differs from other
aouthers by concluding that " If the potential benefits of trade 
liberalization are large reative to the cost of inflation, it may 
make sence to persue liberalization first."
With respect to timing of the liberalization policies, however, 
there are some doubts. Domestic financial market liberalization 
came at early stages of the reform policies. At that time,there was 
a large public sector deficit with no achivement in the inflation 
front. Suggested timing of liberalization of financial market is 
the time when the fiscal deficit has been controlled (Edwards, 
1984). Also, McKinnon (1984) points out that "Fiscal policiy 
should be brought under control before or along with, the move to 
liberalize foreign trade and the domestic capital market.
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Liberalization of capital account of balance of payments then comes 
last”.Foreign trade liberalization came gradually but major 
attempts on this front was in 1984, at the time which inflation had 
gained an increasing momentum. However, according to Senses (1984) 
there are points that are on the side of the timing of the 1984 
Import Regime,these could be summarised as follows;
- Implemented liberalization policies were mutually reinforcing 
with the stabilization policies.
- The international organizations such as the World Bank and IMF 
identified themselves more closely with liberalization efforts and 
this improved Turkey's creditworthiness.
- After the November 1983 elections, the new government's polical 
support was at its peak and this might have reduced resistance from 
the previously protected business sector.
Although the sequencing of the stabilization and the 
liberalization policies was compatible with current concensus, 
stabilization in domestic market had not been achieved yet. Initial 
contractionary policies were able to reduce inflation to 30 
percentage points but later on, both fiscal and monetary policies 
were relaxed. In 1988, after eight years from the beginning of 
reform policies, inflation reached at the levels of the 
acceleration of prereform period. The situation badly resembles to 
the Southern Cone economies. Indeed, they showed better 
performance in this respect. Chile and Uruguay were able to reduce
12 F o r  a detiallad c r l t i q u a  of t i m i n g  of t h a  1 9 0 4  I m p o r t  R a g l m c  
Sanaasa, 1904.
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their fiscal deficits, moreover, they had surplus at the end of 
Phase 1, but not sustained to curb inflation sufficiently. The 
result of high inflation was the shift to the tablita policy. A 
point in favor of Turkey lies in this respect. Turkey did not 
follow the exchange rate policy as an anti-inflationary tool which 
was the main reason for the failure of Southern Cone
economies.Policy lessons drawn from Southern Cone experience
suggest that the use of the exchange rate as an anti-inflationary 
tool leads to macroeconomic disturbances and results would
undermine the stabilization efforts ( Corbo, et.al. 1986 ).
There were departures from stabilization policies such as an 
increased public sector deficit and lack of monetary control.
However, whenever problems arose with liberalization policies 
corrective actions were taken. For instance, control on the
interest ceilings after the financial shrinking- though it was
late. More importantly. Central Bank was able to keep real exchange 
rate fairly stable and competitive - which is a precondition for 
succesful liberalization. The only exception was in the course of 
1984 and in late 1988. To avoid inflationary pressures, exchange 
rate was permitted to appreciate.^3 This was a policy
inconsistency observed in the Southern Cone. Fortunatelly, Turkey 
left this policy in a short time in 1984. However, in late 1988 
authorities seemed more concerned with the high rate of inflation 
and to prevent inflationary pressures they permitted the exchange
13 In 1 0 0 4  r e a l  effectlv-e e x c h a n g e  ra-tea In ifour quart:ere w e r e  a a
f o l l o w a . I n d e x  1 0 8 0 = 1 0 0 ; 1 0 8 4 : 1 = 8 1 . 5
1 9 0 4 : 2 = 0 5 . 5
1 0 0 4 : 3 = 0 7 . 9
1 9 0 4 : 4 = 9 1 . 1  , S o u r c e :  K o p l t a ,  1907.
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rate to appreciate ( 2 percent in Nowember 1988, see note 8). To 
draw a conclusion from such a short lived observation would not be 
adequate, the thing to say is that, hopefully, this practice would 
not last long. Another policy inconsistency in the Southern Cone 
was the conflicts between commercial and exchange rate policies. 
Due to large capital inflows, exchange rate has appreciated and 
thus resulted in a decline in tradable sector's profit margins and 
prevented their expansion.^·* However, in Turkey neither appreciation 
of exchange rate was permitted - with the exception mentioned 
above- nor the tradable sector was squeezed. By contrast, the 
export sector enjoyed large profits helped by incentives. Boratav 
and Türel (1988) conclude that after the stabilization program, 
export sector favored against the import competing and other
sectors and profits of this sector increased cosiderably. However, 
they point out a dilemma that arose from this phenomena; the 
marginal propensity to invest is low in the export sector. This had 
an impact on the decline in investments of productive sector. 
This situation might be regarded as policy inconsistency as long as 
future growth capacity of both exports and the economy as a whole 
is considered.
With respect to wage policies, there are opposite views among 
economists. Kopits (1987), for example, proposes a downward 
crawling real wage policy in order to succed in stabilization and 
liberalization. By contrast, Krueger ( cited in 0dekon,1988) 
strongly opposes this kind of proposotions, and comments that 
"There is no instance that I know of, however, where a country's
14 S e e  C o r b o ·  e't . a.1 . « 1 9 8 8
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trade liberalization has been highly successful! in the context 
of highly rectrictive and (and enforced ) regulations surrounding 
the labor market",and he continues futher, " Most succesful 
liberalization appears to have come about not by the removal or 
reduction in existing wage levels, but rather by a failure to 
adjust wage levels with future inflation." Turkey was a devoted 
follower of the first proposition (see real wages in Table 3). 
However, apart from its negative effects on income distribution, 
the followed wage policy,especially in initial years, had negative 
effects on labor mobility and prevented the shift of more qualified 
labor force towards the expanding export sector. Labor mobility 
itself, would have had favorable effects on the competitiveness of 
the export sector.
The exchange rate regime in Turkey was consistent with other 
policies. In general a fixed exchange rate regime reduces 
authorites power on monetary control. A fully flexible exchange 
rate regime, on the other hand, could bring too much fluctuations 
and leads to increased risk for economic agents. Thus, seeking a 
risk premium as in the case of Southrn Cone. Therefore, suggested 
policy for a small country such as Turkey, is the one that is 
intermediate between fixed and fully flexible exchange rates. 
Turkey's managed floating system fits well to the proposed system.
In terms of liberalization policies, the speed, the sequencing 
and the extent of liberalization are covered in literature. There 
is no single recommended speed of adjustment. The only proposition 
is that initial conditions should be considered and liberalization
15 S e e  VflckhGLm« 1905.
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must proceed with a realistic time table so that economic agents 
can adjust themselves to foreign competition. The important thing 
is to abolish price controls in order to reallocate resources and 
meanwhile to liberalize labor and capital markets. Financial 
markets should be deregulated in such a way that improvements in 
the allocation of credit, and in turn investment is achieved (Corbo 
& de Helo,1987). A laisez-faire version of financial market 
liberalization is not considered an appropriate approach for a 
market that is undeveloped, and this market should be subject to 
appropriate rules and regulations for supervision.
In terms of foreign trade liberalization, first quota lists 
should be abolished and replaced with equivalent tariff rates. In 
time, reduction in tariff rates and in the range of tariffs should 
be implemented according to Corbo and de Helo (1987).
It is not easy to assess the optimal speed and the extend of 
liberalization policies in Turkey, because initially markets were 
heavily depressed. There were forth and back movements in 
liberalization policies. Quotas were abolished first and than 
tariffs were reduced gradually. Later, new import lists were 
created and the, number of items subject to licencing was reduced 
gradually ,all of which were in line with the proposition above. In 
the last year (1988) ,however, first advance deposit requirements 
(permanently) and later tariff rates and surcharges were 
increased. One can argue that market conditions were taken into 
account while implementing trade liberalization, and a relatively 
slow liberalization of trade is consistent with the Turkish 
economy. Because,no more than a few industry could compete in the 
world markets yet. However, with a good observation of world
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markets and informing the firms about forthcoming economic 
conditions, and the current and prospective competition in the 
world markets,and also preannouncing the authorities' intentions 
with respect to liberalization might had helped to speed up the 
trade liberalization.
Financial market deregulation was rapid initially, in addition 
to removed interest ceilings, unorganized nonbank financial 
intermediaries were allowed to operate in financial markets without 
any supervision and this created a financial crisis as in the case 
of Southern Cone. Apart from the crisis, structural conditions of 
commercial banks were omitted. The lack of competition due to 
oligopolistic structure of banks did not allow real interest rates 
to increase at an attractive level and therefore savings did not 
improve much. Also, close interrelationships between the banking 
sector and the large industrial firms or holdings actually, did not 
allow improvement in the allocation of credits, and in turn in 
investments. The statement in OECD Economic Report, Turkey (1988) 
well illustrates the situation;
"Deposit banks are required by law , to allocate 20 percent of 
their lending to medium term loans. Host of the banks meet this 
condition by extending these credits mainly to enterprises within 
the holding to which themselves belong or are associated with. 
Companies which are not in such a priviliged position vis-a-vis 
deposit bank can normally obtain only short term credit or 
overdrafts that are rolled over at current interest rates and 
fees."
Observing the banks' reluctance to offer positive real 
interest rates. Central Bank took control of interest ceilings in
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1983 and interest rate continued to be determined by the monetary 
authority.Later attempts had also failed in liberalizin financial 
markets and Central Bank still remains ready to intervene on 
interest offerings.In sum, financial market deregulation did not 
work as it was supposed to.
It is argued that credibility is an important issue in the 
success of liberalization. With respect to credibility, Turkey has 
some problems especially related with its political history. Host 
foreign countries and especially enterpreneurs are not sure about 
the political stability of Turkey, and therefore equity capital 
flows did not increase much. However, Prime Minister Ozal's and a 
few politicians commitments and Hr. Ozal's personal authority had 
gained credibility especially on the foreign lending side. Also, 
the government was able to reduce internal resistance and to gain 
credibility by succesfully integrating liberalization policies with 
some social programmes like the Mass Housing Fund and the related 
mass-hosing programme.
The sequence of removing distortions from previously regulated 
markets requires reallocation of resources in domestic market. Then 
liberalizing foreign economic relations would take place. General 
argument is that the current account of balance of payments account 
should be liberalized first and then the capital account (He 
Kinnon,1984., Edwards,1984 . , Corbo & de Helo 1987). Advocated 
argument in this issue is that asset markets adjust more quickly 
than the good markets, and liberalizing capital account first would 
result huge amount of capital inflows and creates undesired 
exchange rate appreciation and loss of competitiveness. Turkish 
liberalization policies are in line with this proposition. Domestic
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market and trade liberalization proceeded capital account 
liberalization in Turkey. Although Turkey's external debt increased 
considerably, the source of this increase was not the external 
private capital inflow. Most of the foreign debt is in the form of 
public debt and mainly obtained from IMF, OECD and the World Bank 
credits. Short term debt arose mainly from the emigrants' foreign 
exchange deposits. Turkish banks as well as foreign commercial 
banks were cautious in intermediating credits to Turkey and real 
interest rates on Turkish Lira deposits were not at high figures to 
make foreign borrowing more attractive (Kopits, 1987). Therefore, 
private capital flows were not so much. One thing should be 
remarked here; may be the most wise implication of Turkish 
liberalization policies was that authorities did not provide any 
guarantee to the banks on the external borrowing side and therefore 
they were reluctant to intermediate foreign credits. However, a 
great portion of credits that were intermediated is in the form of 
short term credits (see Table 8).
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6. CONCLUSION
Stabilization and Liberalization policies,in general, have 
succeded in most aspects. Supply shortages were removed, balance of 
payments crisis were overcome, economy became more open, exports 
increased considerably and composition of exports changed in favor 
of industrial products. However, inflation is still high and the 
upward trend still continues. The main source of inflation is the 
public sector deficit and growth in the monetary base. Expansionary 
fiscal and monetary policies had adverse effects on the economy. In 
1988, stagflation became the main public issue. Thus, corrective 
measures must be taken in order to reduce inflation and to prevent 
its undesired consequences, such as misallocation of resources.
Another important development is the decline in manufacturing 
investments both in public and private sectors. Manufacturing is 
the main productive sector and declining investments would bring 
supply shortages in the coming years which in turn would adversely 
affect exports as well. Therefore, increasing manufacturing 
investments by using appropriate incentives is one of the issues 
that requires immediate attention.
Development of new financial institutions and instruments in 
order to increase competitiveness and efficiency of the financial 
markets is a vital issue. This would attract more funds into these 
markets, hence savings would increase and these funds could be 
channelled toward productive sectors (this would also be a well 
substitute for the compulsary saving scheme). In this regard, 
development of a properly operating capital market is a necessity 
for the firms to establish more sound financial structure.
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Foreign debt position of Turkey is delicate. Although at 
present there is no difficulty in repayments, any weakness in 
foreign revenue generating sources would bring foreign exchange 
shortages. Turkey must be more cautious in borrowing from abroad in 
excess of its ability to repay securely.
Host of the burden of the program fell on wage earners. 
Significantly declined real wages aimed to restrain domestic demand 
and to reduce costs in order to increase competitiveness . However, 
the decline in real wages was so much that any further reduction 
might create some undesired social consequences. Relying on the 
decreased real wages in order to increase competitiveness would not 
be viable. Some other measurements, for instance productivity 
improvement must be realized to prevent any potential decline in 
exports. The increase in exports was the most promising development 
after the introduction of stabilization program. Nevertheless, 
succès on this front should not be based only price 
competitiveness, relying on non-price competitiveness such as 
quality improvements ,product and market diversification would 
serve better for the long term prospectives.
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